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A New Theist Response to the New Atheists, edited by Joshua Rasmussen and 
Kevin Vallier. Routlege, 2020. Pp. xii + 216. $155.00 (hardcover).
GREG PETERSON, South Dakota State University
In a recent conversation with a student about matters epistemologi-
cal, I  was surprised when, shortly into the conversation, Christopher 
Hitchens’s name came up. The surprise was twofold: not only was I sur-
prised to have Hitchens’s work brought into a conversation about episte-
mology, I was surprised that the student thought Hitchens still relevant. 
For my part, I  had gradually consigned Hitchens and the other “New 
Atheists” to the dustbin of history. Although Richard Dawkins and Sam 
Harris continue to be active, the New Atheists have long since ceased to 
be new, and society has since moved on to more pressing issues. Or so 
I thought.
The title of Rasmussen and Vallier’s new edited volume suggests oth-
erwise. Not only do the authors remain concerned about the influence of 
the New Atheists, their proposal aims to counter the New Atheists with a 
“New Theism.” New Theism, as laid out in the introduction by Rasmussen 
and Vallier, is distinguished not so much by its content as by its approach. 
Rather than simply dismissing the New Atheists as mere polemicists or 
engaging in strident polemics themselves, the New Theists understand 
their task as one of collaborative inquiry, with the goal being to invite the 
New Atheists into a mutual dialogue that is both more nuanced and more 
productive. By engaging in a mutual exploration of truth, New Theists 
hope to promote a form of inquiry that is both more respectful and, ulti-
mately, more productive.
The volume itself is divided into three parts. The first six chapters fall 
under the rubric of “God and Reason,” covering territory that, in many 
respects, should be recognizable to those familiar with academic debates 
concerning the New Atheism and with philosophy of religion gener-
ally. The first article by Alexander Pruss provides a brief introduction to 
debates over the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) and the argument 
for causal finitism. Pruss examines three paradoxes—Thomson’s Lamp, 
the paradox of Grim Reapers, and the paradox of Die Guessing—in light 
of prime intuitions concerning the implausibility of causal infinities. 
Pruss then presents two arguments for causal finitism, one inductive, the 
other deductive. Pruss invites the reader, including the New Atheist, to a 
mutual investigation into the merits of causal finitism and, Pruss suggests, 
its implications for the idea of an uncaused cause.
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In “An Argument for a Supreme Foundation,” Joshua Rasmussen argues 
from the principle of explanation (PE) that it is rational to believe that 
things have an explanation. If we accept this, Rasmussen argues, it further 
follows that there is some foundation that serves as the explanation of the 
totality of things, since by definition the totality of things would have noth-
ing outside of itself, and yet it still be in need of explanation. Furthermore, 
the attributes of such a foundation would not be categorical and therefore 
not limited, and they would also be great-making (“supreme”). Once we 
recognize this, he argues, we are on the path to recognizing a founda-
tion that looks much like the God of classical theism. In Chapter 3, Dustin 
Crummett and Philip Swenson address the question of whether theism 
provides a better justification for our moral knowledge than naturalism, 
noting that New Atheists such as Sam Harris and Richard Dawkins crit-
icize theism on moral grounds. Crummett and Swenson argue that there 
is good reason to believe that we have moral knowledge and that such 
moral knowledge is widespread. They reject appeals to relativism and 
subjectivism, and they argue that naturalism provides a poor ground for 
believing that our moral beliefs are true. Theism, they argue, does provide 
such grounds, since God, unlike evolution, is a perfect moral being.
In Chapter 4, Chris Tweedt tackles the “data of suffering,” addressing 
the way this can be interpreted from theological and atheological perspec-
tives. Taking inspiration from the epistemological literature on permissiv-
ism—the view that equally legitimate but opposing beliefs can be inferred 
from the same evidence—Tweedt argues that atheological and theological 
perspectives differ in the way they interpret the data of suffering. While 
atheologians often focus on suffering, those adopting a theological per-
spective place greater weight on other elements of life that speak crucially 
and more optimistically to their framework. While some perspectives are 
illegitimate, neither atheological nor theological perspectives fall into this 
category. While change of perspective is challenging, it is not impossible, 
and the atheologian’s encounter with the commitment of the theologian 
can be one factor in such change. In “Is the God Hypothesis Improbable?,” 
Logan Paul Gage tackles Dawkins’s influential “Ultimate 747 Gambit,” in 
which Dawkins argues that God cannot serve as a satisfactory explanatory 
hypothesis because God is too complex an explanans. Gage challenges 
Dawkins’s argument. To do this, Gage distinguishes between quantita-
tive and qualitative accounts of parsimony, arguing that, in both cases, 
naturalism does not provide an obviously simpler explanation than the-
ism. Further Gage argues that in terms of fundamental simplicity, theism 
comes out ahead, and so Dawkins’s “Gambit” is defeated.
In Chapter 6, Liz Jackson tackles the question of the rationality of faith, 
challenging the New Atheist claim that faith is by definition unjustified 
belief and so therefore never rational. Focusing on epistemic rationality, 
Jackson surveys several possible meanings of the charge that faith is irra-
tional, including defining faith as an “epistemically unjustified attitude.” 
In each case, Jackson argues that either the definition in question misses 
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important elements of faith in practice or that the criterion captures other 
sorts of belief which are justifiable. Jackson concludes by arguing that 
faith can be understood in two ways, as a form of Jamesian self-justifying 
belief in the case of non-religious faith or, in the case of religious faith, as a 
form of belief that is not formed merely on strictly empirical evidence but 
which is important for flourishing.
Part 2 of the book turns explicitly to God and morality. In “Deiform 
Morality,” Thomas Ward takes on “Dawkins’s Dilemma”: if you believe 
that without the existence of God you would murder, steal, etc., then you 
are not really a moral person, but if you believe you would not do these 
things even if God didn’t exist, you show that belief in God is not neces-
sary for morality. Ward divides the dilemma into two forms, a factual form 
and a motivational form. The factual form Ward conceives to be easily 
dealt with, arguing that since a gap often exists between belief and action, 
it is quite possible that a person believes one thing and does another. The 
true challenge, Ward argues, is the motivational version of the dilemma. 
The worry here is that a motivation of divine reward and punishment is 
egoistic in character rather than genuinely moral. Ward briefly lays out a 
possible response to this challenge, one grounded partly in an Aristotelian 
conception of human nature and in an understanding of Christian friend-
ship with God.
In “Are We Better Off Without Religion?,” Christian Miller takes up 
the New Atheist argument that religious belief leads to bad moral behav-
ior and that secular (i.e., non-religious) ways of thinking motivate moral 
behavior better than religious ones. Miller succinctly marshals empirical 
data on crime, education, health, charity, and subjective well-being to 
show that, in all these domains, religious individuals (often defined in 
terms of attendance at religious services) outperform non-religious indi-
viduals. Miller admits that this data is largely correlational in character, 
and as such it cannot clearly demonstrate causation. But, he argues, the 
causal arrow from religious commitment to moral behavior is plausible, 
and so the New Atheist argument fails. In Chapter 9, Jennifer Zamzow 
asks the important question of whether engaging in spiritual practices 
entails moral licensing in the same way that, for many people, exercising 
vigorously may create the feeling that one “deserves” the extra slice of 
chocolate cake afterwards. Zamzow acknowledges that there is very little 
direct literature on this issue, but related studies on prayer and licens-
ing behavior generally lead her to conclude that while engaging in some 
spiritual practices may sometimes lead to licensing behavior, this is no 
reason to discontinue them. Rather, we should revise how we do them and 
how we frame them.
In Chapter 10, Paul Copan and Thom Wolf argue for the beneficial moral 
impacts of Christian and, especially, Protestant civilization. Casting a very 
wide net, Coplan and Wolf argue that Christianity has been the source of 
much of what is good in the world, including the spread of democracy 
and education, and they highlight in particular empirical and anecdotal 
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evidence in support of the positive impact of missionaries globally. In 
this, Copan and Wolf see a corrective to Christopher Hitchens’s charge 
that religion poisons everything, and they argue that the secular morality 
of the West is itself based on its Protestant roots. In “Moral Strangers as 
Co-Laborers in the Fields of Justice,” Rico Vitz takes a decidedly different 
approach. Acknowledging the apparent intractability of moral debate in 
contemporary philosophy, Vitz argues that we should instead focus on 
our commonalities. While Christians and atheists may disagree even over 
the implications of such basic valuational concepts as beneficence and 
nonmaleficence, they can nevertheless agree on many substantive issues 
concerning duties to aid those in need. Vitz argues that the practice of 
co-laboring in turn will provide a stronger experiential basis for achieving 
moral consensus than the forensic wizardry of abstract argumentation. In 
Chapter 12, Hunter Baker makes the case for why atheists should support 
the First Amendment free exercise clause. Baker briefly reviews the his-
tory of religious liberty as well as providing a brief account of the consti-
tutional provisions regarding religion. Baker argues that as beneficiaries 
of the free exercise clause, atheists should also respect the free exercise of 
religion despite their denial of religious claims. Baker then devotes much 
of the article to the contentious argument that such respect of free exercise 
extends to two recent cases: the Affordable Care Act provision requiring 
insurance coverage of abortion and the case of Christian vendors refusal 
to service homosexual wedding services. In both cases, Baker argues that 
religious liberty should win out.
Part III, titled “God and Theology,” addresses two distinct issues. In 
Chapter 13, Jordan Wessling responds to Dawkins’s criticism of the doc-
trine of atonement, arguing that God could have forgiven humanity with-
out the suffering involved in the crucifixion. Instead of defending the 
propitiation model, Wessling argues for a deification/theosis approach 
which understands the life and death of Jesus in terms of enabling God to 
effectively model a virtuous human life and thus enable closer participa-
tion in the divine life. Wessling uses the interesting analogy of Alcoholics 
Anonymous, where former alcoholics serve as models and mentors for 
those in the process of recovering. In the crucifixion, Jesus exemplifies 
“oppositional” virtues requisite for human life that cannot be modeled in 
any other way.
In the final chapter, Kevin Kinghorn takes on the question of the fate 
of the good person, Christian or otherwise. Kinghorn rejects the view 
that faith is a matter of belief, and that it is the explicitly held beliefs of 
a Christian that therefore count towards eternal salvation. Rather, faith 
involves commitment to a kind of life, and this commitment can be made 
in the absence of explicit belief in creedal Christianity. To support this, 
Kinghorn appeals to the traditional belief that the Old Testament patri-
archs were saved through their faith despite the fact that they lived before 
Jesus was born. The Holy Spirit, Kinghorn argues, can work in Christian 
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and non-Christian alike, and entry into heaven is influenced by this char-
acter of commitment as well.
Who is this book for? The book’s Preface suggests that the text is aimed 
at the New Atheists themselves or, at least, their followers who might be 
persuaded to engage the mutual dialogue many of the authors envision. 
Some essays succeed in this tone of mutual dialogue more than others, and 
the articles by Jackson, Miller, Zamzow, and Vitz stand out among those 
that do so well, sometimes by selecting topics that serve to open engage-
ment. The emphasis on moral categories is also a strength, since they have 
not received the same level of attention in the New Atheist debate. It also 
reveals some issues, not least being the highly problematic assumption in 
a few essays that the concrete moral commitments of Christians just are 
the moral commitments espoused by conservative evangelicals. Several 
essays are conventionally apologetic in tone, primarily aiming to defend 
the truth or superiority of Christianity without fully engaging either the 
arguments put forward by New Atheists and their allies or the motiva-
tions for their arguments. In an effort aimed at mutual engagement, the 
latter is especially important, since, if the arguments of an opponent are 
poor, motivated reasoning is a likely cause, and understanding motiva-
tions is thus crucial to understand why the arguments are made in the first 
place. Some of the essays succeed in this endeavor, and most but not all 
achieve at least a balanced tone.
Likely the main audience will be undergraduate students enrolled in 
philosophy of religion or related classes, especially but not exclusively 
in Christian-affiliated universities. The essays are short and readable, 
often serving as a jumping off point to important themes in the phi-
losophy of religion, both old and new. In this sense the essays usefully 
serve as an invitation, and this is true even for those essays that are 
more clearly apologetic in their orientation. Despite their brevity, many 
of the essays are thoughtful and nuanced, and essays such as those by 
Tweedt, Wessling, and Kinghorn are able to demonstrate richness in 
thinking in a limited amount of space. Taken together, the essays also 
suggest a different kind of invitation, not simply to a “New Theism” 
but to philosophy itself. As the volume makes plain, the cardinal sin of 
the New Atheists is, in important respects, the abandonment of careful, 
nuanced reasoning in favor of the delicious but self-serving bon mot. 
An engagement by both sides that is genuinely more humane, more 
empathetic, more careful both in its reasonings and in its characteriza-
tions of the partisans of the opposing side would be a welcome develop-
ment. Philosophy is distinctive in its capacity to encourage this kind of 
more thoughtful and more reflective engagement that is, arguably, more 
needed now than ever. In this, the volume’s language of invitation and 
mutual exploration of truth is a welcome development, one that I hope 
has significant impact.
